

Risk-Limiting Audits by Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections (SUITE)

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Risk-limiting audits

Statistical check that tabulation errors would not change the electoral outcome.



Risk limit: chance of failing to correct a wrong outcome


RLAs are hypothesis tests.

H_0 : The reported winner is **wrong**.

Risk = P-value


Ballot-level comparison audits

- Voting machines must export a **cast vote record (CVR)**
- Every ballot can be linked to the CVR
- Compare manual interpretation of ballots to CVR




Batch-level comparisons are also possible.

- Compare machine tally with audit tally




Ballot-polling audits

- Like drawing marbles from a jar and estimating proportions
- No CVR used
- Less efficient than ballot-level comparisons



Workload depends on contest margins and method.

Expected audit size in 13.7 million ballot election
(logarithmic scale)



(These estimates assume that there are no errors!)

Colorado RLAs

Existing possibilities: ballot polling or batch-level comparisons everywhere



Stratified random sampling

Stratified sampling

- Partition a population into non-overlapping groups and draw independent random samples from those groups
- Useful when there are separate pools of ballots:
 - Contests that span multiple jurisdictions
 - Vote-by-mail, provisional ballots, and ballots cast in person
 - Ballots cast on heterogeneous voting equipment
- Higgins et al. (2011) considered RLAs for stratified samples using a particular auditing method and test statistic

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Idea: sample strata independently, then combine the audit results.

Stratum 1


Error = X

Stratum 2

Error = Y

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Idea: sample strata independently, then combine the audit results.



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Overall error \geq Margin

if and only if

there exists $(\lambda_s)_{s=1}^S$ such that

Error in stratum $s \geq \lambda_s$ Margin

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Idea: sample strata independently, then combine the audit results.

$$H_0 \iff \cup_{\lambda} \cap_{s=1}^S H_{0s}(\lambda_s)$$

Stop the audit by showing that no such λ exists.


$$H_0 \iff \cup_{\lambda} \cap_{s=1}^S H_{0s}(\lambda_s)$$

- Method is agnostic to the auditing strategy in each stratum
- For each stratum-level hypothesis, obtain a p-value


$$p_s(\lambda_s)$$


$$H_0 \iff \cup_{\lambda} \boxed{\cap_{s=1}^S H_{0s}(\lambda_s)}$$

$$\chi(\lambda) = -2 \sum_{s=1}^S \ln p_s(\lambda_s)$$




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H0: Total error $\geq V$




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H0: Total error $\geq V$



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$$H_0 \iff \boxed{U_\lambda} \cap_{s=1}^S H_{0s}(\lambda_s)$$


To stop the audit, we must always reject $H_{0s}(\lambda_s)$ at risk limit α .

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Maximize Fisher's combined P-value:

- Approximate via grid search of λ values




$$H_0 \iff \boxed{U_\lambda} \cap_{s=1}^S H_{0s}(\lambda_s)$$

To stop the audit, we must always reject $H_{0s}(\lambda_s)$ at risk limit α .

Maximize Fisher's combined P-value:

- Approximate via grid search of λ values
- For $S=2$, construct piecewise constant upper and lower bounds for the P-value



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
1. Divide ballots into non-overlapping strata.
2. Draw initial samples from each stratum.
3. Maximize Fisher's combined P-value over all error partitions λ .
4. If the maximum is above the risk limit, escalate the audit and repeat.

SUITE applied:

Colorado Case Study

Colorado RLAs

Existing possibilities: ballot polling or batch-level comparisons everywhere



Colorado RLAs


Existing possibilities: ballot polling or batch-level comparisons everywhere

Solution using SUITE:

- **Two strata:** one with ballot polling counties, one with the rest
- Requires modifying existing tests for ballot polling and ballot comparison

SUITE in Colorado

Expected audit size in 13.7 million ballot election
(logarithmic scale)



(These estimates assume that there are no errors!)

- SUITE is a general risk-limiting audit for stratified samples
- Agnostic to audit strategy in each stratum
- Immediate application for statewide contests in the U.S.

Thanks!



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